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Migration and the Tiebout-Tullock Hypothesis 
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Richard f. Cebula 
Abstract: This empirical study investigates the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis as it 
might have applied to net domestic state in-migration rates over the period 
1990 through 1999. It appears that the net state in-migration rate has been 
directly related to the ratio of the total state plus local government outlays per 
capita on public education in a state to that state's total state plus local govern-
ment tax burden per capita. Other variables included in the study, including 
the previous-period median single-family housing price inflation rate, a mea-
sure of previous-period growth in real income per capita, and quality-of-life 
variables reflecting violent crime rates and sunnier climates, also seem to be 
significant determinants of the net state in-migration rate. Thus, for the study 
period, it appears that the Tie bout-Tullock hypothesis played a significant role 
in determining internal migration patterns. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There exists an extensive body of literature dealing with the determinants 
of internal migration. Greenwood (1975) and Cebula (1979) provide surveys of 
earlier-period studies. Some of the more recent or more frequently cited contribu-
tions relevant to the present study would include Cebula (1974), Cebula and Belton 
(1994), Clark and Hunter (1992), Conway and Houtenville (1998, 2001), Gale and 
Heath (2000), Glantz (1973), Herzog and Schlottman (1986), Lybbert and Thimany 
(2000), Pack (1973), Renas (1980, 1983), Saltz (1998), and Vedder (1976). There are 
a number of these studies that have yielded potentially profound public policy 
implications, namely, those studies that investigate the so-called Tiebout or 
Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis. In general terms, the empirical findings regarding the 
Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis for the pre-1990 period are that: poor migrants have 
tended to be attracted to areas offering higher levels of public assistance; most 
migrant groups have been attracted to areas with higher per capita outlays on 
public education; and most migrant groups, especially the elderly and higher-
income migrants, prefer areas with lower tax (especially property tax and income 
tax) burdens. 
The so-called Tiebout (1956, p. 418) hypothesis can be stated, as follows: 
"The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satis-
fies his preference pattern for public goods." Tullock (1971) effectively restates the 
hypothesis in a way that emphasizes that the choice consumer-voters make is one 
of assessing bundles of local public goods and services and tax liabilities. In any 
event, to the extent that the excess of the perceived net value of local public goods 
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and services over associated tax liabilities is not capitalized into property values 
in a given area, in-migration to that area should increase as consumer-voters 
attempt to reap the benefits of any perceived "fiscal surplus." 
Although the Tie bout-Tullock hypothesis was empirically investigated at 
length for the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, inquiries into the hypothesis have 
been relatively small in number for the period of the 1990s. Accordingly, for the 
1990 through 1999 period, this exploratory study seeks to investigate the Tiebout-
Tullock hypothesis empirically, thereby integrating 2000 census information and 
providing updated and current analysis. The model deals with net domestic in-
migration rates at the state level and includes fiscal as well as purely economic 
and quality-of-life factors. 
This study differs from other related studies in one or more ways. First, 
this study deals with net domestic state in-migration rate determinants for the 
period 1990 through 1999, a period that to date has not received extensive atten-
tion in terms of the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis. Second, unlike most related stud-
ies, geographically comparable living cost levels are included, although not as a 
separate variable, but rather in such a way as to create a geographically compara-
ble expected real future income proxy. The focus on state-level migration parallels 
numerous earlier studies, including Cebula (1974), Cebula and Belton (1994), Conway 
and Houtenville (1998, 2001), Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001), Gale and Heath 
(2000), Gallaway and Cebula (1973), and Saltz (1998). Third, the previous-period 
median single-family housing price inflation rate in each state is included in the 
model as a separate explanatory variable. This variable is intended to reflect the 
potential negative in-migration impact that might result as higher previous-period, 
median single-family housing price inflation led to higher current levels of housing 
prices. Fourth, the Tie bout-Tullock fiscal variable for each of the 50 states is 
expressed as the ratio of total state plus local government outlays per capita on 
public education in any state to that state's per capita total level of state plus local 
government taxes. This specification is effectively unique within this migration lit-
erature for the study period. 
It is hoped that the differentiating traits listed above will enable the pre-
sent study to provide useful updated insights into the migration impact of the 
Tie bout-Tullock hypothesis. In any case, section 2 of this study provides a simple 
model of migration as an investment. Sections 3 and 4 provide four alternative 
empirical estimates. Finally, section 5 provides concluding observations. Clearly, 
focusing on state net domestic in-migration differs sharply from focusing on state 
net population growth rates since the latter involves births, deaths, net federal 
movement, international migration, and net domestic in-migration. Arguably, the 
last is the most reflective of the Tie bout-Tullock framework. 
II. A SIMPLE MODEL 
This study follows the models in Riew (1973) and Cebula (1979, Chapter 
4). In particular, the consumer-voter is treated as regarding the migration decision 
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as an investment decision. Consequently, the decision to migrate from area i to 
area j requires that the net discounted present value of the move from area ito area 
j, DPVij, be both (a) positive and (b) the maximum perceived net discounted 
present value that can be expected by moving out of area i into any other known 
alternative. 
As suggested by the models in Riew (1973) and Cebula (1979, Chapter 4), 
the net discounted present value of migration from area ito area j, DPVij, consists 
of the following three major components: 
1. expected real income or income growth (I) in the areas and housing price 
inflation (HINF) and related housing price changes in the areas; 
2.expected benefits from publicly provided goods and services, such as 
public education (PE), and expected costs from tax liabilities (T) in the 
areas; and 
3.expected quality-of-life (QOL) characteristics in the areas. 
Accordingly, it follows, based on Riew (1973) and Cebula (1979, Chapter 4), 
that migration will flow from area ito area j only if: 
(1) DPVij > 0; DPVij =MAX for j, j = 1, ... ,n, 
where n represents all of the feasible and known alternative locations to area i. The 
decision to migrate from state ito state j implies that for some persons, DPVij > 0 
and also that their DPV is expected to be maximized in state j. 
From this framework, it follows that for state j: 
(2) MIGj = f(Ij, HINFj, PEj, Tj, QOLj) , 
where MIGj is in-migration to state j. Expressed in linear terms, the model in 
Equation 2 becomes the following: 
(3) MIGj =a+ blj + cHINFj + dPEj + eTj + fQOLj . 
Based on conventional migration modeling and the Tiebout-Tullock 
hypothesis, it is expected here that: 
(4) b>O,d>O,e<O,f>O. 
It is also hypothesized in the present study that c < 0. This is because to the extent 
that greater previous-period median single-family housing price inflation in a state 
led to subsequently higher current levels of housing prices and thus to a higher over-
all cost of living in the state, that state will be less attractive to in-migration (Cebula 
1978; Renas 1980). Thus, ceteris paribus, net in-migration to a state is expected to 
be inversely related to its previous-period median single-family housing price 
inflation rate. 
III. THE INITIAL REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
Predicated on the framework summarized in Equations 3 and 4, the fol-
lowing two reduced-form regressions are initially estimated: 
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(5) MIGj = aO + a1PGPCRij + a2SUNSHINEj + a3VCRIMEj + a4HPij + 
a5PETj +u' 
(6) LOGMIGj = bO+ b1PGPCRij + b2SUNSHINEj + b3VCRIMEj + b4HPij + 
where: 
MIGj 
LOGMIGj 
aO,bO 
PGPCRij 
b5PETj + u" , 
=the net domestic in-migration to state j between 1990 and 1999, 
expressed as a percentage of state j's 1990 total population; 
=log of the net domestic in-migration rate to state j between 
1990 and 1999; 
= constants; 
=the percentage growth rate of per capita real income in state 
j, 1981-1990, as a proxy for expected future income opportu-
nities in state j; 
SUNSHINEj = the average annual percentage of possible sunshine in state 
j (i.e., the average annual percentage of daylight in state j 
that sunshine is experienced); 
VCRIMEj =the number of violent crimes in state j per 100,000 popula-
tion, 1992; 
HPij = the average annual median single-family housing price 
inflation rate in state j, 1980-1990, as a percentage; 
PETj =ratio of total state plus local government outlays per capita 
on public education in state j (PEj) to total state plus local 
government taxes per capita in state j (Tj), 1992, expressed 
as a percentage; and 
u , u = stochastic error terms. 
The data source for variable MIGj is the U.S. Census Bureau (2000, Tables 
20, 22). For the quality-of-life variables SUNSHINEj and VCRIMEj, the source is 
the U.S. Census Bureau (2000, Table 414; 1994, Table 303). The data for variable 
HPij are obtained from Chao and Cebula (1996, Table 1). The cost-of-living index 
(COLj) for deflating nominal per capita income into real per capita income is 
obtained from McMahon (1991, Table 3). McMahon (1991) formulates reduced-
form estimations for computing a geographically comparable state-level living-
cost index for each of the years from 1981 through 1990. The variable PGPCRij is 
computed as follows: 
(7) PGPCRij = 100* [ {PIPCj, 1990/COLj, 1990)- {PIPCj, 1981/COLj, 1981) ]/ 
where: 
(PIPCj, 1981/COLj, 1981) I 
PIPCj, 1990; PIPCj,1981 =the nominal per capita income in state j in 1990 
and 1981, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2001, 
Table 727; 1985, Table 731); and 
Migration and the Tiebout-Tullock Hypothesis Revisited 91 
COLj, 1990; COLj, 1981 =the cost of living for the average four-person 
family unit in state j in 1990 and in 1981, respec-
tively, expressed as an index (average = 100.00) 
(McMahon 1991, Table 3). 
The PGPCRij ratio, expressed as a percentage, is treated as the measure of 
the expected future growth rate in real income per capita in state j, i.e., as a measure of 
expected economic opportunity in state j. In principle, this specification parallels 
that in Cebula and Belton (1994), Gale and Heath (2000), and Saltz (1998).The vari-
ables SUNSHINEj and VCRIMEj are intended to reflect elements of the quality of 
life that have previously been found to affect migration patterns (Milligan 2000; 
Conway and Houtenville 1998, 2001; Gallaway and Cebula 1973; Cebula 1979, 
1990; Gale and Heath 2000; Renas 1978, 1980; and Saltz 1998). The PEj and Tj vari-
ables (U.S. Census Bureau 1994, Tables 476, 479) from the previous section have 
been combined here into a single variable, PETj, as suggested in the different 
(although somewhat parallel) analysis in Cebula (2002) of net population growth 
rather than net domestic in-migration. This specification addresses the fact that 
PEj and Tj are likely to be highly correlated, especially since state budgets are gen-
erally required to be balanced. In any event, the ratio PETj (=PEj/Tj) is expressed 
as a percentage. Relatively long time lags for explanatory variables reflect an effort 
to allow sufficient time for full or nearly full information to flow to households; 
however, shortening the time lags does not materially alter the conclusions. 
Estimating regression Equations 5 and 6 by OLS, while adopting the White 
(1980) procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity, yields Equations 8 and 9, 
respectively: 
(8) MIGj = -D.54 + 0.029 PGPCRij + 0.0049 SUNSHINEj -0.008 VCRIMEj 
( +4.23) ( +3.61) ( -2.62) 
- 0.00064 HPij + 0.0003 PETj 
( -2.67) ( +4.23) 
RSQ = 0.54, adjRSQ = 0.49, F(5,44) = 10.27 
(9) LOGMIGj = -2.34 + 0.102 PGPCRij + 0.016 SUNSHINEj -0.036 VCRIMEj 
( +4.49) ( +3.67) ( -3.01) 
- 0.002 HPij + 0.00008 PETj 
( - 2.52) ( +3.98) 
RSQ = 0.51, adjRSQ = 0.46, F(5,44) = 9.25, 
where the terms in parentheses beneath the coefficients are t-values. All ten of the 
estimated coefficients in Equations 8 and 9 have the hypothesized signs and are 
statistically significant at the 5% level or beyond. Indeed, nine of the ten coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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The estimated coefficients on the expected real income variable in these two 
estimates are both positive and significant at the 1% level. Hence, it appears that 
the previous-period percentage growth rate of real income per capita, as defined 
above, as a proxy for expected future real income growth and/ or employment 
opportunities, acts to significantly and positively influence net domestic state in-
migration. This finding is consistent with the recent finding on state migration by 
Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001, p. 349) that " ... people move to places of greater 
perceived economic ... opportunity." Next, the estimated coefficients on the SUN-
SHINEj and VCRIMEj variables are positive and negative, respectively, and sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the net state in-migration rate tends to 
be higher in states having a higher percentage of sunshine and lower in states hav-
ing a higher rate of violent crimes. This finding that quality-of-life considerations 
affect migration is consistent with numerous studies, including the recent contri-
butions by Conway and Houtenville (1998, 2001), Gale and Heath (2000), Milligan 
(2000), Saltz (1998), and Clark and Hunter (1992). In Equations 8 and 9, the esti-
mated coefficients on the previous-period median single-family housing price infla-
tion rate variable are negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, the net state 
in-migration rate tends to be lower to those states where the previous-period 
median single-family housing price inflation rate has been higher. These results 
are consistent with Cebula (1978) and Renas (1980). Presumably, this finding may 
be because to the extent that higher previous-period median single-family hous-
ing price inflation in a state led to higher current housing price levels in the state, 
a significant disincentive for in-migration to the state may have been created. 
Finally, in Equations 8 and 9, the estimated coefficients on variable PETj 
are both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, the evidence 
implies that states with higher ratios of state plus local government public educa-
tion outlays per capita to state plus local government tax burdens per capita expe-
rience greater net domestic in-migration rates. These results provide strong empir-
ical support for the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis for the study period. This finding 
is in principle consistent with the recent related studies of somewhat earlier 
migration by Conway and Houtenville (1998, 2001), Clark and Hunter (1992), 
Saltz (1998), and Gale and Heath (2000). 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION 
It is suggested in Cebula (1990) for elderly migrants and in Saltz (1998) for 
younger migrants age 20-40 years that the mere existence of a state income tax sys-
tem, of and in itself, may act as a deterrent to in-migration. Accordingly, follow-
ing both of these studies, regression Equations 5 and 6 are so amended as to 
include an additional variable, TDj, which is a dummy (binary) variable indicat-
ing whether or not state j has a state income tax system (U.S. Census Bureau 1994, 
Table 479). Specifically, TDj = 1 for those states having a state income tax system, 
TDj = 0 otherwise. State income tax systems exist in 43 of the 50 states. These OLS 
estimates, again using the White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity, are pro-
vided in Equations 10 and 11: 
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(10) MIGj = +0.02 + 0.027PGPCRij + 0.0047SUNSHINEj- 0.008VCRIMEj 
(+4.21) (+3.99) (-2.82) 
-0.0005HPij + 0.0002PETj- 0.056TDj 
( -2.27) ( +3.81) ( -1.66) 
RSQ=0.57, adjRSQ=0.51, F(6,43)=9.49 
(11) LOGMIGj = -2.12 + 0.0959PGPCRij + 0.015SUNSHINEj- 0.0004 VCRIMEj 
(+3.45) (+3.86) (-3.18) 
-0.002HPij + 0.00007PETj- 0.16TDj 
(-2.22) (+3.45) (-1.62) 
RSQ = 0.53, adjRSQ = 0.47, F(6,43) = 8.2 
In Equations 10 and 11, the estimated coefficients on the variables 
PGPCRij, SUNSHINEj, and VCRIMEj are significant at the 1% level or beyond 
with the expected signs. In addition, the estimated coefficients in Equations 10 
and 11 on variable HPij are negative and significant at the 5% level. Clearly, these 
results are entirely consistent with the corresponding results in Equations 8 and 9. 
In Equations 10 and 11, although the estimated coefficients on the income tax 
dummy variable both have the expected negative signs, they are not quite statis-
tically significant at even the 10% level. Thus, the evidence regarding the signifi-
cance of the existence of a state income tax system for net state in-migration over 
the 1990s is very weak. It should be observed that in two separate estimates, in 
place of variable TDj, the maximum marginal state personal income tax rate in 
each state (TMAXj) was used, with those seven states having no state income tax 
system at all simply assigned a value of zero (i.e., TMAXj=O). In both of these esti-
mates, the overall results were entirely consistent with those in Equations 10 and 
11 above. In any event, it is of course noteworthy that the estimated coefficients on 
the PETj variable in Equations 10 and 11 both are positive and significant at the 
1% level, once again providing strong empirical support for the Tie bout-Tullock 
hypothesis. 
Thus, the net state in-migration rate for the study period appears to be 
positively related to the previous-period real income per capita growth rate and 
the quality of life as reflected in the variable SUNSHINEj, while being inversely 
related to the state previous-period median single-family housing price inflation 
rate and the violent crime rate. Furthermore, the net state in-migration rate does 
appear to follow a Tie bout-Tullock pattern insofar as it is positively related to the 
ratio of state plus local government outlays per capita on public education to state 
plus local government tax burdens per capita. On the other hand, the evidence 
appears to indicate that the existence of a state income tax system per se may not 
have significantly affected the net state in-migration rate during the study period. 
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Finally, it is observed that alternative versions of the model yield further 
support for the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis. For example, consider the following 
model: 
(12) MIGj =cO+ clPAGSPj + c2HAZj + c3HPij + c4PETj + u"' , 
where: 
PAGSPj = the average annual growth in gross state product in state j, 
1979-1988, as a percentage (Chao and Cebula 1996, Table 1); 
and 
HAZj = the number of hazardous waste sites in state j, 1993 (U.S. Census 
Bureau 1994, Table 372). 
This model adopts a different measure of expected economic opportunity 
(PAGSP) and uses a different measure of the quality of life (HAZ) than the esti-
mations above. Nevertheless, the OLS estimation, after using the White (1980) cor-
rection, lends strong support to the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis: 
(13) MIGj = -0.139 + 0.026 PAGSPj- 0.005 HAZj- 0.00063HPij + 0.0004 PETj 
( +3.59) ( -2.05) ( -2.34) ( +2.13) 
RSQ = 0.51, adjRSQ = 0.47, F ( 4,45) = 11.87. 
In this estimate, the estimated coefficient on the PET variable is positive and sig-
nificant at beyond the 5% level. Indeed, substitution of the cost-of-living index for 
1990 from McMahon (1991) for the HPI variable yields results nearly identical to 
those in Equation 13. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This empirical study has examined the impact on the net domestic state in-
migration rate over the 1990 through 1999 period of a variable reflecting the 
Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis. This study controls for the impacts of interstate previous-
period real income per capita growth rate differentials, previous-period median 
single-family housing price inflation rate differentials, and quality-of-life factors 
such as sunshine and violent crime rates. The results strongly suggest that the 
Tie bout-Tullock framework is alive and well. Indeed, the evidence consistently 
indicates that the net state in-migration rate has been an increasing function of the 
ratio of state plus local government outlays per capita on public education to the 
state plus local government tax burden per capita over the study period. 
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